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Abstract
In this paper we consider a scheme for cryptographic key distribution based on a variation of
continuous variable quantum key distribution called central broadcast. In the continuous variable
central broadcast scheme, security arises from discord present in the Hanbury Brown and Twiss
effect from a thermal source. The benefit of this scheme is that it expands the range of frequencies
into the microwave regime. Longer wavelengths, where the thermal photon number is higher
and correlations remain robust over long distances, may even be preferable to optical wavelengths.
Assming that Alice controls the source but not the distribution of the light (eg satellite broadcasts),
then we demonstrate that the central broadcast scheme is robust to an entangling cloner attack.
We establish the security of the protocol both experimentally and theoretically.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is rapidly gaining widespread acceptance [1] as a
method of secure key exchange and several high bandwidth devices have been demon-
strated.However, having distributed information across a network, there remains a limitation
of key exchange at the user access point. For the end user, wireless access is the ideal use
model. The user access system must be both inexpensive and accessible without compro-
mising security and maintaining the ability to work on scales of the order of metres to tens
of metres.
Recently, the potential of thermal states for QKD has been established [2, 3]. Although
thermal states have sometimes been described as too noisy [4, 5], they exhibit Hanbury
Brown and Twiss correlations which have been found to exhibit positive discord [6], a nec-
essary condition for QKD[7].
Consider a central broadcast protocol in which the radiation is split between twol parties,
who now have correlated signals from which they can build a key. Another advantage
to using thermal states is that they are easy and low-cost to produce. Whereas large-
scale implementations of QKD such as those described above require specific infrastructure,
thermal states central broadcasting protocols can be implemented over short distances, with
low-power devices.
In the scheme proposed in [2]: a thermal source is incident on a beamsplitter, with one
output port connected to Alice and the other to Bob. We assumed that Alice controls the
source, the channel leading to the beamsplitter and the beamsplitter itself. They also control
the channel separating them from the beamsplitter. The only part opened to Eve resides on
the branch between the beamsplitter and Bob. We found that there is both a positive key
rate and positive discord between the legal parties, both at optical frequencies (experimental
result) and microwave frequencies (theoretical analysis). In [3], the authors shine a thermal
source on a beamsplitter to prepare the states used by the legal parties in QKD, and find
that such a source average photon number of 100 allows for efficient passive QKD.
In this paper, we relax our security by surrendering control of the channel between the
source and the beamsplitter, leaving it open to attack. Alice retains control of the source,
the beamsplitter, their channel and detector. Eve can then attack the channel going to Bob
([2]) or the channel going to the beamsplitter. This aims to provide Eve greater knowledge
of the states making up the thermal radiation.
In the following, we describe the protocol and its modelling in more details. Finally we
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FIG. 1: In this situation, a satellite beams down a signal, which is received by Alice, Bob
and Eve. Eve can have a very large portion of the signal, but she does not control the
signal being emitted.
present theoretical and experimental results that demonstrate the security of this scheme.
PROTOCOL
This protocol is illustrated on Figure 1. A source (for instance a trusted satellite)
emits thermal radiation which is picked by the legal parties and the eavesdropper. We can
consider that Eve can access quite a large portion of the signal, intercepting much of what
should go to Alice and Bob. We model this by giving Eve an entangling cloner, so she can
divert as much of the signal to her as convenient. However, we consider that the source is
trusted; this means that the eavesdropper does not use the satellite to relay her own signal.
We express the protocol formally as follows :
• Alice creates a beam from a trusted thermal source.
• On the way to their trusted beamsplitter with transmittance η2, the signal is interfered
with by Eve, via an entangling cloner denoted η1.
• Alice uses η2 to divert part of the signal to her detector and send the rest on to Bob.
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FIG. 2: This is the schematic for this iteration of the protocol. The change in slight :
effectively, Eve and Alice switch places, hence the deceiving resemblance between the
schematics as shown in [2] and this one.
• Similarly to [2], the bunched nature of the pairs coming out of η1 means that fluctua-
tions present at Alice’s detector are correlated with those at Bob’s detector.
• To derive their data, Alice and Bob slice these fluctuations as convenient; as an ex-
ample, a fluctuation above the mean could be a 1 and a fluctuation below the mean,
a 0.
• Like any QKD scheme, our protocol requires quantum correlations. To confirm that
the signal from Alice and Bob are correlated is done through verifying the thermal
nature of their signal. Thus, Alice sends Bob small chunks of data for him to perform
a g(2) calculation. A g(2) > 1 means that the signal is thermal.
• Alice and Bob now have a stream of independent and randomly correlated bits from
which they can derive a key, the security of which they can improve with Cascade and
Advantage Distillation, as per any QKD scheme.
This scheme was implemented as shown on Figure 2. In order to simulate high levels of
noise, we consider two attenuator channels between η2 and the legal parties, equivalent to
adding a beamsplitter of transmittance η3 between η2 and Alice (η4 for Bob) , with a input
state of variance N3 (and N4) at the second input arm.
Once again, this is not a prepare-and-send scheme. Alice controls the source, but the
process of splitting pairs happening at the beamsplitter is stochastic, therefore unpredictable.
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Eve has no access to the channels between η2 and either Alice or Bob, nor any control over
their detectors.
Theoretical modelling
Let us recall that thermal states can be modelled using Gaussian statistics, which
makes them easily defined and manipulated through their first and second moments [8, 9].
The former are contained in the displacement vector 〈rˆ〉, where rˆ is the system’s operator,
and ρ the state’s density operator. The second moments are contained in the covariance
matrix γ defined as
γij = Tr [ρ {(rˆi − 〈rˆi〉), (rˆj − 〈rˆj〉)} ρ] ,
where we write the anti-commutator using {}. A thermal state has covariance matrix γin =
2(n¯ + 1)I, where n¯ is the average photon number and I the identity matrix, and null
displacement. We use the Bose Einstein distribution
n¯ =
1
e~ω/kBT − 1 , (1)
and consider detectors measuring radiation at 30GHz and T = 300K, so that n¯ = 1309.
The beamsplitters are modelled as
V i =
 √ηiI µiI
−µiI √ηiI
 ,
where ηi is the transmittance and µi =
√
1− ηi represents the noise. They act on the state
as γout = V γinV
T .
The input state at the first beamsplitter contains the thermal source and Eve’s source; it
has covariance matrix and displacement vector
γin =

V xs 0 0 0
0 V ps 0 0
0 0 V xe 0
0 0 0 V pe
 rin = (xs; ps;xe; pe)T .
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We note the structure of the covariance matrix as γin = γsource
⊕
γEve. The two empty sub-
matrices would represent potential pre-existing correlations between the source and Eve,
which in our set-up, is unrealistic.
The output of the second beamsplitter is
γout =

γ˜b γ˜ab γ˜eb
γ˜ab γ˜a γ˜ea
γ˜eb γ˜ea γ˜e
 .
We make the channel between η2 and Alice, and between η2 and Bob thermal noise
channels by inputting states of variance N3 on Alice’s branch and N4 on Bob’s as
Ni =
ηiχi
1− ηi , with χi =
1− ηi
ηi
+ i ,
and i the channel excess noise [9]. The input state at η3 and η4 is then
γint =
 N3 0
0 N3
⊕ γout⊕
 N4 0
0 N4
 ,
where γout is the state at the output of η2, the first block sub-matrix is the input state at η3
and the last sub-matrix, the input state at η4.
The output covariance matrix is
Γout =

Γ˜v Γ˜va Γ˜ve Γ˜vb ˜Γvv′
Γ˜va Γ˜a Γ˜ea Γ˜ab ˜Γav′
Γ˜ve Γ˜ea Γ˜e Γ˜eb ˜Γev′
Γ˜vb Γ˜ab Γ˜eb Γ˜b ˜Γbv′
˜Γvv′ ˜Γav′ ˜Γev′ ˜Γbv′ Γ˜v′

where the block sub-matrices are given in the appendix.
Maurer and Wolf [10] have proved a theorem providing conditions to be satisfied for a
scheme such as ours to be secure. The theorem reads as follows :
[quote]
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Theorem 1. In Scenario 1, the following conditions are equivalent :
1. I(A : B|E) > 0
2. K(A : B ‖ E) > 0
3. I(A : B ↓ E) > 0
[end quote] [14]
where K(A : B ‖ E) is the secret key rate. The third condition is actually the most
restrictive. I(A : B ↓ E) is the intrinsic conditional mutual information; it determines the
unreducible amount of conditional mutual information between Alice and Bob, regardless of
any attemps by Eve at acquiring more information through local operations; in other words,
it is information inaccessible to Eve. Furthermore, it satisfies
I(A : B ↓ E) < I(A : B|E) ,
which makes it a tighter condition on the secret key rate.
We can see its relation to the quantum discord if we recall that the latter, D(B|A), is
defined as the difference between the mutual information I(A : B) and the classical mutual
information J(B|A) (or J(A|B)). I(A : B) quantifies all possible correlations between Alice
and Bob, but J(B|A) quantifies those measured by local operations at Alice’s and Bob’s
sites. Therefore, it can be understood as the intrinsic conditional mutual information as
described previously. Let us therefore, rewrite the theorem as :
Theorem 2. In our central broadcast scheme, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. I(A : B|E) > 0
2. K(A : B ‖ E) > 0
3. D(B|A) > 0
It is therefore enough in principle, to demonstrate that either condition is satisfied. We
shall however, prove two, namely the positivity of the conditional mutual information and
that of the discord. The latter will allow us to demonstrate the quantum nature of the
secrecy.
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The mutual information I(A : B) is given by
I(A : B) = S(Γa) + S(Γb)− S(Γab) ,
where S(x) is the Von Neumann entropy and Γi the covariance matrices of A, B and AB
respectively. The Von Neumann entropy is given by
S(x) =
N∑
i=1
(
xi + 1
2
)
log
(
xi + 1
2
)
−
(
xi − 1
2
)
log
(
xi − 1
2
)
where xi are the symplectic eigenvalues of Γ. The discord is defined explicitely as
D(B|A) = S(Γa)− S(Γab) + min
Γ0
S(Γb|xA)
where Γb|xA is the covariance matrix of B conditionned by a homodyne measurement on A
[11]
Γb|xA = Γb − Γab(XΓaX)−1ΓTab ,
with X =
 1 0
0 0
 and ()−1 the pseudo-inverse. The conditional mutual information is
I(A : B|E) = S(Γae) + S(Γbe)− S(Γe)− S(Γabe) .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The protocol was realised experimentally. The thermal source is provided by a super-
luminescent diode coupled to an external cavity, making it a tuneable laser, run without any
added modulation. The laser can be run separately in coherent or in thermal mode, and
the thermality of the source was established in [2]. The source bandwidth was measured at
∆λ = 0.4nm spread around a centre wavelength of λ0 = 780.09nm; this give a coherence
time of τc = 4.8ps. The detectors are ThorLabs Det36A photodiodes, coupled to a LeCroy
Waverunner 44xi oscilloscope; the combined integration time is 14ns and the oscilloscope
samples at 5GSps.
The conditional mutual information is calculated from the sliced data strings using Shan-
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FIG. 3: Conditional mutual information for thermal states (left) versus coherent states
(right). We can see that when η1 → 1, so when there is no amount of Eve coming between
the legal parties, the conditional mutual information peaks.
non entropies H(x) = −∑ p(x) log(p(x)) in terms of the measured frequencies p(x).
Figure 3 shows that the scheme works experimentally as predicted. I(A : B|E) is best
as η1 tends to 1, and at η2 = 0.5, so when Alice and Bob gets equal shares of most of the
thermal source signal. This corresponds to a situation where the eavesdropper is absent,
and where there is minimal loss. As long as the η1 > 0.5, the eavesdropper gets little of the
signal and the advantage is to the legal parties. However, no matter how much signal Eve
receives, the conditional mutual information is always positive, and never exhibits a sharp
fall-off, typical of point-to-point schemes over the 3dB limit. This means that it is always
possible to build key, albeit slowly.
Figure 3 allows us also to illustrate that this scheme cannot work in the coherent regime.
As mentioned before in [2], coherent radiation is not bunched; therefore, it holds none of the
intrinsic correlations contained in bunched pairs. There is no splitting of pairs occuring at the
beamsplitters, because there are no such pairs; single photons travel through uncorrelated to
Alice and Bob, who as a result can build no key from them. This is shown on the right-hand
graph of the figure. I(A : B|E) remains constant, no matter how much Eve lets through,
no matter the split between Alice and Bob.
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FIG. 4: We plot the conditional mutual information I(A : B|E) (left) and the discord
D(B|A) (right)against η1, with η2 = 0.5, η3 = η4 = 0.2 and 3 = 4 = 10−2. At η2 = 0.5,
Alice and Bob share equal part of the signal.
Let us now compare these results to those obtained through our theoretical modelling.
Figure 4a shows the behaviour of the conditional mutual information as Eve lets more
and more of the signal through. The plots match our experimental results. The higher η1,
the higher I(A : B : |E). Also, since I(A : B|E) is always positive, we conclude there always
is secrecy in our scheme.
We can also explore how the initial state of Eve influences the secrecy between Alice and
Bob. For that, we vary Ve and see that as it increases, I(A : B|E) increases also. The reason
for this, we have mentioned before and will detail further in the lines below.
Figure 4b illustrates the positivity of the discord, regardless of η1. This means that there
always are quantum correlations between Alice and Bob. This satisfies the third of the
conditions from our theorem, and we can affirm quantum secrecy.
What is remarkable is the value of the discord when η1 is null, so before Eve begins
to let the source signal through. In this case, what is actually measured is the amount of
quantum correlations within Eve’s state. We have seen that the higher Ve is, the higher
I(A : B|E), but here we see that the discord follows a similar trend. This is particularly
evident when Ve = 250SNU .
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This is a result of the physics of thermal states. To understand this, let us step back and
consider a single beamsplitter (input arms labelled 1 and 2, output arms labelled 3 and 4)
with a thermal state at one input. Since it is bunched, there will be correlated photon pairs
travelling into the beamsplitter. If both photons travel into the same input (say arm 1), we
can expect three outputs [12] :
• both photons are travelling through on arm 3 P (23, 04),
• both photons travel onto arm 4 P (03, 24) or
• one photon for each arm P (13, 14).
This corresponds to Eve inputting a vacuum or a coherent state at arm 2 and why we can
in fact equate her to any loss in the channel.
On the other hand, if Eve inputs a thermal state as well, there is now a correlated pair of
photons travelling into each input arm. This will gives us the following outputs: P (43, 04),
P (03, 44), P (23, 24), P (33, 14), and P (13, 34). The third case P (23, 24), is three-degenerate;
either both pairs get to the other side in one piece (which accounts for two degeneracies) or
both pairs are split (the remaining degeneracy). This means that accounting for all possible
outcomes, there are only two cases where there will not be at least one correlated pair
travelling into η2 to Alice and Bob: either one pair is split at η1 and Eve gets three photons
P (33, 14) (mitigated by the fact that Eve would choose to let most of the signal through at
η1 in order not to be noticed) or both pairs are split at η1, which is one of the P (23, 24)
degeneracies.
If Ve = 1SNU , then Eve inputs a vacuum state, and Alice and Bob build key solely
from the pairs produced at the source. As a result, the discord is minimal at η1 → 0. If
Ve > 1SNU , Eve’s state can be regarded as thermal; in this case, she contributes pairs to
those coming from the source. In fact, if the eavesdropper’s input is too significant, the legal
parties can build a quantum secure key, regardless of how much signal is coming from the
source. As in any QKD, we expect that the eavesdropper will try to minimise her input,
if only to escape detection. At best, she can hope to merely “listen” in, in which case, her
input is Ve = 1SNU . Yet, as soon as signal begins going through (η1 > 0.1), the legal parties
can build a quantum secure key, albeit slowly.
Let us point out that these plots have been obtained for very high level of noise on Alice’s
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and Bob’s branches. Indeed η3 and η4 are such that 80% of their signal is lost. Yet, even in
this case, the legal parties are able to construct a quantum secure key.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In our previous protocol, the security arose from the quantum correlations within a
pair which would split between Alice and Bob. Since Eve placed herself on the arm going to
Bob, she would interfere with/capture photons on their way to him, but she could not build
a three way correlation sufficient to attack key exchange. In this paper, she places herself
prior to the splitting of the pairs between Alice and Bob, interfering with the pairs directly
from the source. Unlike the situation in [2], she is not limited by the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle and can intercept and resend bunched pairs at her leisure. Therefore, the legal
parties cannot distinguish the pairs coming from her to those coming from the source. This
is not as bad as it sounds, however, because since Eve has no interaction with the output
of η2, any correlations within the pairs split at η2 are completely safe from tampering. So
actually, as long as Alice and Bob have a g(2)(0) > 1, their pairs, regardless of their origins,
are correlated, and quantum secrecy is possible [2].
This is the strength of this scheme. Even if Eve succeeds in hiding in the noise, if her
input is not either vacuum or a perfect coherent state, she will contribute correlations to
the pool which Alice and Bob can build key from, but she cannot know when or if these
injected states have contributed to the key. Another option for Eve is to actually become
the source; we explore this in a forthcoming publication.
This experiment was carried out at optical frequencies using a pseudo thermal source,
however, the theoretical modelling was performed at values of n¯ consistent with the mi-
crowave regime. Interferometeres used in radio astronomy rely on the presence of thermal
correlations being preserved over astronmical distances, and as the results in this paper
suggest that the results are highly portable to the microwave regime. Hence, this method
of key exchange appears to be a viable option for long distance key exchange.
The authors are grateful to network collaborators J. Rarity, S. Pirandola, C. Otta-
viani, T. Spiller, N. Luktenhaus and W. Munro for very fruitful discussions. This work was
supported by funding through the EPSRC Quantum Communications Hub EP/M013472/1
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Protocol 2
After η2
The submatrices are as follows
γ˜b =
 η2 + µ22(η1V xs + µ21V xe ) 0
0 η2 + µ
2
2(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1V
p
e )

γ˜a =
 µ22 + η2(η1V xs + µ21V xe ) 0
0 µ22 + η2(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1V
p
e )

γ˜e =
 µ21V xs + η1V xe 0
0 µ21V
p
s + η1V
p
e

γ˜ea =
 −µ1√η1√η2(V xs − V xe ) 0
0 −µ1√η1√η2(V ps − V pe )

γ˜eb =
 −µ1√η1µ2(V xs − V xe ) 0
0 −µ1√η1µ2(V ps − V pe )

γ˜ab =
 µ2√η2(η1V xs + µ21V xe − 1) 0
0 µ2
√
η2(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1V
p
e − 1)

Ater η3 and η4
The submatrices are as follows
Γ˜e =
 〈X˜e2〉 0
0
〈
P˜e
2
〉
 , Γ˜a =
 µ23N3 + η3 〈X˜a2〉 0
0 µ23N3 + η3
〈
P˜a
2
〉

Γ˜b =
 µ24N4 + η4 〈X˜b2〉 0
0 µ24N4 + η4
〈
P˜b
2
〉
 , Γ˜v =
 η3N3 + µ23 〈X˜a2〉 0
0 η3N3 + µ
2
3
〈
P˜a
2
〉

Γ˜v′ =
 η4N4 + µ24 〈X˜b2〉 0
0 η4N4 + µ
2
4
〈
P˜b
2
〉

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Γ˜ea =
√η3 〈X˜aX˜e〉 0
0
√
η3
〈
P˜aP˜e
〉
 Γ˜eb =
 √η4 〈X˜bX˜e〉 0
0
√
η4
〈
P˜bP˜e
〉

Γ˜ab =
√η3√η4 〈X˜aX˜b〉 0
0
√
η3
√
η4
〈
P˜aP˜b
〉
 , ˜Γvv′ =
 −µ3µ4 〈X˜aX˜b〉 0
−µ3µ4
〈
P˜aP˜b
〉

Γ˜vb =
 µ3√η4 〈X˜aX˜b〉 0
0 µ3
√
η4
〈
P˜aP˜b
〉
 , ˜Γav′ =
 −√η3µ4 〈X˜aX˜b〉 0
0 −√η3µ4
〈
P˜aP˜b
〉

Γ˜va =
 µ3√η3 (〈X˜a2〉−N3) 0
0 µ3
√
η3
(〈
P˜a
2
〉
−N3
)

˜Γbv′ =
 µ4√η4 (N4 − 〈X˜b2〉) 0
0 µ4
√
η4
(
N4 −
〈
P˜b
2
〉)

Γ˜ve =
 µ3 〈X˜aX˜e〉 0
0 µ3
〈
P˜aP˜e
〉
 , ˜Γev′ =
 −µ4 〈X˜bX˜e〉 0
0 −µ4
〈
P˜bP˜e
〉

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